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Abstract. Mobile communication technologies can provide citizens access to infor-
mation that is tailored to their specific circumstances. Such technologies may there-
fore increase citizens’ ability to vote in line with their interests and hold politicians
accountable. In a large-scale randomized controlled trial in Uganda (n=16,083), we
investigated whether citizens who receive private, timely and individualized text mes-
sages by mobile phone about public services in their community punished or rewarded
incumbents in local elections in line with the information. The majority of respondents
claimed to find the messages valuable and there is evidence that they briefly updated
their beliefs based on the messages; however, the treatment did not cause increased
votes for incumbents where public services were better than expected nor decreased
votes where public services were worse than anticipated. The considerable knowledge
gaps among citizens identified in this study indicate potential for communication tech-
nologies to effectively share civic information. Yet the findings imply that when the
attribution of public service outcomes is difficult, even individualized information is
unlikely to affect voting behavior.
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1 Introduction
The rapid spread of mobile phones in low-income countries enables users to gain new informa-
tion directly relevant to their well-being, including prevailing prices at markets, opportunities for
employment, and business ideas. Indeed, there is good evidence that gaining access to a mobile
phone can be an important catalyst for improved livelihoods (Dammert, Galdo and Galdo, 2014).
Yet there are fewer indications about whether mobile phones can help people overcome the politi-
cal barriers that keep them in poverty.
Several studies have investigated interventions and circumstances that promote information
sharing from citizens to public officials using mobile phones (Ferrali et al., 2020; Grossman,
Humphreys and Sacramone-Lutz, 2014, 2020; Buntaine, Nielson and Skaggs, 2019). However,
the available evidence does not indicate that this kind of information sharing causes meaningful
changes in the provision of public services (Grossman, Platas and Rodden, 2018; Buntaine, Hun-
nicutt and Komakech, 2020).
Fewer studies have tested whether good-governance organizations can use mobile phones to
provide information to voters so that their choices at the polls align with the programmatic per-
formance of politicians, which would give politicians incentives to deliver good public services.
Buntaine et al. (2018) report that sending text messages by mobile phone about corruption in dis-
trict governments caused Ugandan voters to condition their votes on the information for the lower
office of district councillor but not for the higher office of district chair. Aker, Collier and Vicente
(2017) report that a civic campaign conducted partly by mobile phone increased turnout in Mozam-
bique, but did not decrease electoral irregularities. Yet neither of these interventions leveraged the
full potential of mobile phones to tailor information to the preferences and circumstances of each
individual voter. In contrast to other ways voters receive information, such as radio, television,
or newspaper, mobile phones might contribute to electoral accountability by providing voters with
information that is individualized to voters’ interests and contexts.
We investigate whether individualized messages about the comparative quality of public ser-
vices that individual voters deemed most important changed those voters’ choices in local Ugandan
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elections. Prior to the 2016 district (LC5) and sub-county (LC3) elections, local enumerators per-
formed audits of primary schools, roads, health care, and water access in 762 Ugandan villages
in a nationwide, area-probability sample.1 We completed a baseline survey with 16,083 Ugandan
citizens with mobile phones in the same villages and asked each respondent which of these four
public services was most important in determining their vote for local officials.
We collaborated with a non-governmental organization in Uganda to send factual messages
about these public services to voters prior to local elections. The density of these treatments was
intentionally kept low to minimize the probability of influencing the aggregate outcome of any
election and the voters receiving the messages provided individual informed consent. We individ-
ualized the messages in several ways. First, we shared information about the public service that
each participant stated was most important when deciding how to vote. Second, we localized the
information by conducting and sharing audits from each respondent’s village. Third, we contex-
tualized the information by sharing how service quality in the respondent’s village compared to
that in other villages in the district. Finally, we made the information personal by referring to the
respondents by their first name and by using their preferred local language.
We predicted and pre-registered that individualizing information would be an effective strategy
for improving electoral accountability. Yet, while most citizens found the message useful and there
is some evidence that treated voters updated their beliefs about the comparative quality of public
services, the text messages did not significantly alter voters’ choices for district or sub-county
offices. Good news indicating that the quality of the selected local service – whether it be roads,
health clinics, water access, or primary schools – was better than expected did not significantly
increase votes for incumbent district or sub-county councillors or chairs. Bad news that the chosen
service was worse than expected did not significantly decrease support for incumbents. These null
results are precisely estimated and robust to numerous alternative specifications and data subsets.
The findings cast further doubt on the potential for informational campaigns to promote elec-
toral accountability (Dunning, Grossman, Humphreys, Hyde and McIntosh, 2019; Dunning, Gross-
1Audits on schools were completed by our partner NGO, Twaweza.
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man, Humphreys, Hyde, McIntosh, Nellis, Adida, Arias, Bicalho, Boas et al., 2019), especially
where voters struggle to attribute credit or blame. As in many decentralized environments, re-
sponsibility for Ugandan public services is shared between multiple layers of government (Martin
and Raffler, 2021). This makes inferring responsibility for public service outcomes challenging
for voters.2 Additionally, while we find evidence of belief updating after district elections, these
effects do not persist after we sent additional messages prior to sub-county elections, reflecting the
difficulty of durably shifting political beliefs. The results highlight the many challenges citizens
face in sanctioning politicians for poor public services or rewarding them for good public services
in low information, decentralized environments.
Research Expectations
Information about public performance and public goods appears to affect voting behavior when
information is salient and attributable to individual politicians. Public audits of local government
officials released before elections in Brazil significantly reduced the probability of reelection for
politicians who engage in above-average corruption (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Report cards on
politician performance in India’s slums induced higher turnout and higher vote shares for incum-
bents who were rated favorably on public spending (Banerjee, Kumar, Pande and Su, 2010). A
civic information campaign in Mali, which included information about politician performance,
appeared to increase programmatic voting in Mali (Gottlieb, 2016).
However, in many contexts, sending voters information about the performance of their incum-
bent politicians does not seem to influence voting behavior on average. Humphreys and Weinstein
(2013), for instance, found no impact of scorecards on voter choices in Uganda’s national parlia-
mentary elections or on parliamentarians’ actions. Transparency about politician performance can
even work against public accountability by inducing incumbents to hide their activity (Malesky,
Schuler and Tran, 2012) or discouraging voters from turning out (Chong et al., 2015). Most per-
suasively, a meta-analysis of six coordinated trials across five countries found no detectable av-
2As we elaborate in the SI Section 1, responsibility for most services in this study are shared by LC3 and LC5
governments. Additionally, central government bureaucrats retain control over many procurement procedures and
budgets.
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erage effect on vote choice from sending voters information about politician performance prior
to elections (Dunning, Grossman, Humphreys, Hyde and McIntosh, 2019; Dunning, Grossman,
Humphreys, Hyde, McIntosh, Nellis, Adida, Arias, Bicalho, Boas et al., 2019). Our study was part
of this Metaketa I initiative as an alternative treatment arm. We aimed to offer a contrast with the
more common approach of providing similar information to all voters.
In particular, we leverage an insight of Lieberman, Posner and Tsai (2014) that information
must be individually important, novel and different from prior beliefs to change behavior. Us-
ing mobile phones enabled our team to deliver information tailored to respondents’ circumstances
and expressed informational needs. Unlike most existing interventions, we provided information
privately about the public service respondents stated was most relevant to their vote choice and an-
alyzed the effects conditional on voters’ prior beliefs about politicians’ performance. Additionally,
rather than informing voters about broad regional or national government performance, we tailored
the information to each individual’s context. Finally, we made the information timely by sending
messages in the days immediately prior to the election.
We hypothesized that providing private, individualized, and timely information would have
a number of direct and heterogeneous effects. Specifically, when respondents receive positive
information about incumbent politicians’ relative performance as compared to their prior beliefs
– “good news” – they should be more likely to support incumbents and to upgrade their beliefs
about incumbent integrity and effort. We expected the opposite effects when respondents receive
“bad news.” We also expected good news to enhance a sense of political efficacy and thus increase
turnout and bad news to depress turnout.
We expected the informational treatment to have larger effects when respondents received in-
formation very different from their prior beliefs, were more uncertain about the performance of
politicians at baseline, or placed greater importance on public services. We also expected respon-
dents who were not part of the same tribe as the incumbent, who received information consistent
with their political alignment, and who had not been given gifts prior to the election would be more
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likely to respond to the messages. We pre-registered all these hypotheses in advance of treatment.3
Research Design
Context and Sample
Uganda is a semi-authoritarian country, the modal regime type in sub-Saharan Africa, with re-
stricted access to information and considerable inequities in public service delivery, poverty, and
effective governance (Tripp, 2010; Tumushabe et al., 2010). The treatments targeted the 2016
elections for chairs and councillors in districts (or LC5) and sub-counties (LC3), which are the two
most important levels of government for the delivery of basic public services. Elections for these
offices are held every five years and won with a plurality of votes. Incumbents are not term-limited.
Citizens assigned to treatment received text messages on how their preferred local service in their
village compared to district averages. Citizens assigned to a placebo condition received text mes-
sages about the general importance of public services for well-being. We sent many reinforcing
text messages by mobile phone a few days before the February 2016 district elections for chairs
and councillors and before the March 2016 sub-county elections for chairs and councillors.
Several features of Uganda’s 2016 local elections make them particularly illuminating for un-
derstanding the effects of information on voting. First, frequent government interference tends to
focus on national elections, allowing more opportunities for citizens to hold officials accountable
in local elections. Approximately 85% of local elections were contested by at least two candidates
(district chairs in our sample averaged 3 competitors) (Electoral Commission, 2016). Candidates
from 7 different political parties and independents contested LC5 chair elections, while candidates
from 12 parties and independents contested LC3 chair elections. Most respondents (73%) in our
sample expected local elections to be free and fair. Second, unlike more established democracies,
citizens in Uganda face large barriers to obtaining accurate information about politics due to gov-
ernment control and repression of public media (Tripp, 2010). As we document, most citizens
lack the ability to effectively assess the comparative quality of their public services, and many
3The pre-analysis plan and amendments are available at https://osf.io/t4qjx/.
5
have misconceptions about the functioning and performance of local governments (Bainomugisha
et al., 2015). Due to the relative political openness and large service delivery remit of local coun-
cils, these are also elections where effective civic interventions are likely to have a large policy
impact. We discuss the context of these elections in more detail in SI Section1.
We completed baseline surveys with 16,083 subjects from 762 nationally representative vil-
lages in 27 of 111 Ugandan districts. Details on the sample can be found in SI Section 2. Because
the experiment required that subjects possess mobile phones, the final sample skews more educated
and had a larger proportion of males compared to the general population (Afrobarometer, 2015).
Treatment, Placebo & Baseline Survey
Enumerators conducted independent audits of three local public services in each sampled village:
access to improved water sources; road conditions; and the cleanliness, availability of medicines,
and wait times at local health facilities. In addition, we collated data from our partner Twaweza’s
pre-existing audit of primary schools, which independently tested student achievement. Focus
groups indicated these four services would be especially salient to voters. We provide more details
on each audit in the SI Section 4.
From the audits we created indices of “service quality” normalized by district. The process
produced the treatment, which indicates whether services in each village are “much better,” “bet-
ter,” “a little worse,” or “much worse” than other villages in the same district. Messages were sent
to subjects only for the public service they selected as most important or, when an audit was not
available, their second choice (applicable to 22% of respondents, see SI Section 10.2). We in-
tended this treatment to provide subjects evidence about whether politicians were performing well
or poorly compared to other villages in the district. This information was novel and valuable for
the majority of respondents (see SI Table S4 and Section 10.2).
A baseline survey conducted before treatment collected information on prior beliefs about pub-
lic services, voting intentions, and the most important public service, as well as background infor-
mation about the subjects’ prior political participation and demographic characteristics (see SI
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Sections 10.2 and 11.1). We use this baseline data to conduct balance and attrition tests in SI
Section 11. We also use these data to test for heterogeneous effects hypothesized in advance.4
Using complete randomization, we assigned half of all subjects in each village to the public-
services treatment and the other half to the placebo condition. Over five days, treated subjects
received two to four messages per day in their native language reporting factual audit information
about the comparative quality of the public service that they deemed most important for voting.
They were provided a series of messages about the overall score for that service relative to other
villages in the district. We also explained whether the legal responsibility for the public service
belonged to the LC3, LC5 or both. Placebo respondents received only general information – in the
form of public service announcements – about the importance of quality public services without
any information about the performance of their politicians. Examples of treatment and placebo
messages are shown in SI Tables S2 and S3.
Voting & Turnout Outcomes
To produce measures of vote choice and turnout, local enumerators based at a call center con-
ducted endline surveys following each election. The endline surveys measured (1) votes for dis-
trict and sub-county council chairpersons and councillors, (2) perceptions and knowledge of the
incumbents’ performance, (3) vote buying and motivations for voting, (4) engagement with elected
officials, and (5) voter turnout.
We used self reports of voting from the post-election survey, as opposed to actual votes counted
at the precinct level, for several reasons. First, for ethical reasons we desired to avoid affecting
aggregate election outcomes. Given large enough treatment effects, random assignment by village
may have swung local elections. Second, for analytic precision and to align with the larger meta-
analytic study of which this experiment was a part (Dunning, Grossman, Humphreys, Hyde and
McIntosh, 2019; Dunning, Grossman, Humphreys, Hyde, McIntosh, Nellis, Adida, Arias, Bicalho,
Boas et al., 2019), we wanted to account for individual-level variables such as prior beliefs and
4Many questions were informed by the pre-analysis plan of the Metaketa I project (Dunning, Grossman,
Humphreys, Hyde, McIntosh, Nellis, Adida, Arias, Bicalho, Boas et al., 2019).
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voting intent. Third, treatment assignment at the village level would have considerably reduced
statistical power.
The measures of vote choice from our endline survey correlate well with the official returns
(see SI 6 and Figure S6). We employed multiple approaches to detect possible misreporting, and
we show that responses do not meaningfully differ depending upon whether the respondent was
surveyed after the announcement of the election results or whether respondents could consistently
describe the polling station. See SI Section 5.
Estimation
As pre-registered, we split the sample into two groups based on whether each subject was eligible
to receive good or bad news about their preferred public service based on their prior belief. We then
collapse all types of good news and bad news into single treatment indicators T+i or T
−
i , which
equals one when the subject i is treated and is part of the relevant subset L+ or L−, respectively
for good or bad news.
Our primary estimating equation is given by Equation 1 (shown for the good news subgroup).
In it yij,t=1 indicates whether the subject voted for the incumbent party for the political office
j, yij,t=0 indicates whether the subject stated that they intended to vote for the incumbent party
during the baseline survey, β is a vector of estimated coefficients, Xi is a matrix of pre-specified,
pre-treatment covariates, νj is a village fixed effect, and εi is the error term clustered by individual
when pooling across offices or sharp null standard errors when not pooling. We test our hypotheses
on vote choice only for contested offices with and without an extensive array of pre-treatment
covariates, which produced substantively similar results. SI Section 12 explains departures from
our pre-analysis plan, which do not affect the substantive results reported in the main text.
yij,t=1 = α + τ1T
+
ik + ϕyij,t=0 + βXi + νj + εi (1)
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Results
We first consider four direct effects of treatment in Figure 1: vote choice for the incumbent (panels
A & B), beliefs about incumbent integrity (panels C & D), beliefs about incumbent effort (panels
E & F), and turnout (panels G & H). We see no consistent evidence that subjects eligible for good
news who were treated responded positively on any of these outcomes, nor that subjects eligible for
bad news who were treated responded negatively, compared to placebo subjects. The large sample
size and its resulting strong statistical power mean that these null results are precisely estimated.
A likely explanation for the lack of a treatment effect on vote choice (Figure 1, panels A-B)
is that respondents did not update their beliefs about incumbent integrity or effort in response
to treatment (Figure 1, panels C-F). We conjecture that voters’ challenges in attributing public
service outcomes to local politicians may explain why the informational treatment did not affect
these outcomes.
And finally, the evidence suggests that neither good news nor bad news significantly affected
voter turnout, as shown in Panels G and H of Figure 1. The possible exception is the effects of bad
news in increasing turnout for district chair, which goes against expectations. However, this result
does not retain significance after adjustment for multiple comparisons.
As displayed in Figure 2, pre-registered expectations regarding heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects – for large differences in priors, uncertainty, importance of services, politician-alignment,
tribal identity, and receipt of gifts – are likewise not borne out in the results. The only significant
exception is that voters not aligned with politicians that are treated with bad news are more likely to
turn out (Panel H). Figure 2 shows treatment effects within subgroups defined by the pre-specified
moderator for ease of exposition. The preregistered approach without pooling across offices, which
yield the same conclusions, are displayed in SI Figures S9 - S12. These results provide more con-
fidence that the treatment did not prompt programmatic voting, since the hypothesized effects are
not evident among voters most likely to respond to the treatment.
These precisely estimated null effects are surprising in light of the successful receipt of the
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Figure 1: Direct effects of treatment with good and bad news subgroups. Notes: 95% confi-
dence intervals derived from sharp null standard errors by randomization inference. Sample used
for estimation of panels A and B excludes uncontested elections and elections where the incumbent
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Figure 2: Conditional effects of treatment with good and bad news subgroups. Notes: Estima-
tion pools each outcome across all politicians for each individual, with 95% confidence intervals
derived from robust standard errors clustered at the level of the individual, which is the level of
pooling results across politician and election types for this figure. Sample used for estimation
of panels A-F and I-L excludes uncontested elections, elections where the incumbent switched















Updating Type partial updating perfect updating
Belief Updating about Public Services
Figure 3: Belief updating about the comparative quality of public services. Notes: Estimates
with 95% confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors clustered at the district level.
Sample includes subjects who were able to receive treatment messages about their priority public
service and not reassigned to a different service due to missingness in audits.
subjects that indicated the messages were generally considered valuable (Table S4). Additionally,
we see strong evidence that treated subjects expressed beliefs about the comparative quality of
public services that were either closer to the audit information (“partial updating”) or matching the
audit information (“perfect updating”) following the LC5 election (Figure 3). Belief updating did
not persist after the second wave of treatment messages prior to the LC3 election. These decaying
effects over time may indicate that subjects changed their beliefs in response to campaigns in the
two weeks between surveys. Subjects may also have found the treatment information more salient
when they first received it prior the LC5 election compared to when the same information was
repeated prior to the LC3 election. Consistent with findings in more developed democracies, these
estimates suggest political information delivered during an active campaign may have short-lived
effects (Gerber et al., 2011).
Discussion
Our results provide further reason to be cautious about efforts to improve electoral accountability
through information provision. The intervention we study was designed to improve on more gen-
eral, blanket information campaigns that have typically yielded disappointing results on program-
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matic voting (Dunning, Grossman, Humphreys, Hyde and McIntosh, 2019; Dunning, Grossman,
Humphreys, Hyde, McIntosh, Nellis, Adida, Arias, Bicalho, Boas et al., 2019). We provide well-
powered evidence that even when information is novel, timely, individualized, and private, it will
not necessarily affect vote choice. Because the information was tailored to individual circumstance
and preference, the results of this study provide even stronger evidence than currently exists about
the impotence of information campaigns in settings where attribution for outcomes is not clear.
One possible explanation for these null results is that voters were uncertain about which politi-
cians are most accountable for the quality of the local public services. Responsibility and financing
for many local services is shared across LC3s, LC5s, and civil servants working for the national
government (Manyak and Katono, 2011; Martin and Raffler, 2021). As a result, it is far from triv-
ial to know whom to praise or blame for public service outcomes. Nevertheless, we do not detect
treatment effects among voters who received messages attributing their chosen service to one level
of government, as compared to voters who received messages about services attributed to multiple
levels of government (see SI Section 9).
Our treatment and use of technology are purposefully similar to those being adopted by many
good-governance organizations and thus offer practical lessons. First, our results strongly suggest
that citizens in Uganda do in fact lack sufficient information to hold politicians accountable for
public services (SI Figure S15). Yet they also confirm that providing information is rarely enough
to solve accountability gaps, particularly in decentralized contexts or where long or overlapping
accountability chains of resources and responsibilities make attributing outcomes to individual
officials difficult (Dunning, Grossman, Humphreys, Hyde and McIntosh, 2019; Lieberman, Posner
and Tsai, 2014; Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster and Khemani, 2010). While our intervention
provided brief information about politicians’ responsibility for services, future interventions might
better pair information about performance for delivering public services with more substantial civic
education about politicians’ responsibilities, which has been effective elsewhere (Gottlieb, 2016;
Adida et al., 2019).
Additionally, our research highlights the importance of understanding citizen beliefs about ac-
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countability and attribution as a precursor to effective interventions. While information in our
study was novel and individualized, there is no evidence that the treatment caused changes in be-
liefs about incumbent integrity or effort, even when beliefs about the comparative quality of public
services changed. This suggests that good-governance organizations need to better understand
not just the institutional structure of public service delivery, but also citizen beliefs about these
institutions and the nature of service delivery.
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